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The	aims	and	objectives	of	this	research	are:	1.8.1	Aims		 1. To	use	a	literature	review	to	identify	the	aspects	of	Social	Network	Theory	that	can	be	used	to	describe	a	startup	accelerator.	2. To	provide	a	summary	of	the	main	academic	literature	about	accelerators.	3. To	apply	this	theory	to	the	design	of	EyeFocus	accelerator	in	order	to	examine	it	in	situ.	4. To	use	this	exercise	to	reach	conclusions	on	how	accelerators	should	be	designed	and	run	in	the	future.		5. To	create	a	definition	of	an	accelerator	based	on	Social	Network	Theory	which	can	inform	the	design	and	execution	of	future	accelerators.		1.8.2	Objectives			To	review	the	literature	about	Social	Network	Theory	in	order	to:	a. better	understand	the	wider	context	of	Social	Network	Theory	in	which	this	thesis	sits	b. define	the	vocabulary	with	which	to	describe	the	aspects	of	Social	Network	Theory	relevant	to	accelerators		c. understand	the	wider	discipline	of	Social	Network	Theory	and	its	relationship	to	innovation	and	entrepreneurship			To	review	the	literature	about	accelerators	in	order	to:	a. understand	the	evolution	of	startup	accelerators		





b. create	an	historical	context	in	which	to	position	the	thesis,	and	EyeFocus	Accelerator	c. define	the	core	aspects	of	an	accelerator	and	the	accepted	terminology	used	to	describe	them	d. identify	existing	practice	in	running	accelerators	e. define	an	accelerator	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis		To	use	the	findings	of	the	literature	review	to	inform	the	design	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	in	order	to:		a. provide	a	case	study	for	this	thesis	in	which	hypotheses	can	be	tested	and	examined	in	situ		b. lead	to	conclusions	that	contribute	to	the	knowledge	about	how	better	to	describe	and	understand	accelerators,	and	therefore	how	better	to	design	and	implement	them		Based	on	the	outcomes	of	this	exercise,	to:	a. make	recommendations	about	how	Social	Network	Theory	should	inform	the	design	of	accelerators	b. to	provide	a	definition	of	an	accelerator	based	on	this	research		to	inform	the	design	and	execution	of	future	accelerators	c. make	recommendations	for	future	research	on	this	topic			




































Action research around a case study had benefits, for example allowing the research to be 
reflected in the activity of the case study, and that activity then to inform the research back 
again.  





However, it creates limitations as well.  The most notable limitation with this research was 
the challenge of being both the researcher of a business, and the person running that business 
at the same time. Because the business had the funding, and was supporting the research, the 
business had to take priority over the research, both relating to decisions about the direction 
of either, and because time had to be prioritised for the business over the research. If the 
business had failed it would have undermined the research, but without the research the 
business could still succeed.  
 
Being a case study involving live businesses, namely the startups on the program, restricted 
how some of the data gathered could be used in the research. Discussions of the startups in 
the research could not be allowed to damage the businesses in anyway, which remain 
ongoing after the episode of activity being studied. This relates to commercially sensitive 
data, but also to reflections that might in some way damage the businesses reputationally in 
their future.  
 
Furthermore, working with a large pharmaceutical company, in particular, raised issues 
because such companies are very tightly regulated, which impacts on how information about 
their involvement with EyeFocus could be discussed openly in this thesis.  
 
Related to these three points, some of the data collected during the program was either 
incomplete because it had been gathered quickly during fast moving periods of business 
activity, or became less valuable once it had been anonymised.  
 





Many of these limitations echo observations by researchers whose work on accelerators is 
examined in the literature review, who found that accelerators rarely have the resource to 
gather large data sets from the programs they are running. This proved to be the case with 
EyeFocus. As outlined in the section on future research (see 7.3), it would be valuable in the 
future to see full time researchers embedded in accelerators to gather data and carry out 
research in order to overcome these limitations.  	 										



















































































































































































































































































































































1.	 “Open	and	competitive	application	process	2.	 Pre-seed	investment,	usually	for	equity		3.	 Focus	on	small	teams,	not	individual	founders	4.	 A	defined	time	frame	of	education	and	intensive	mentoring	5.	 Cohorts	of	startups	rather	than	individual	companies”		Miller	&	Bound	also	observed	the	growth	of	social	venture	accelerators,	such	as	Bethnal	Green	Ventures	in	London,	addressing	the	rise	in	interest	of	impact	investing	from	the	investor	perspective,	and	a	desire	by	startup	founders	to	address	social	problems	with	a	startup	approach	rather	than	the	traditional	grant	funded	charity.	The	accelerator	model	was	therefore	adapted	to	address	this	combined	market	of	investors	and	founders,	using	the	same	principles	of	mentoring,	cohorts,	and	intensive	programs.			Continuing	the	argument	made	by	Tarani	(2010)	about	efficiencies	of	the	cohort,	Frimodig	(2012)	observed	that	accelerators	were	mainly	founded	by	entrepreneurs	and	were	seen	as	a	means	to	address	the	“competence	and	equity	gap”	of	startups.	By	acting	more	broadly	as	a	connector	in	the	entrepreneurial	ecosystem	they	were	understood	to	create	value	beyond	just	that	for	the	people	directly	involved,	such	as	investors	and	startups.			Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	defined	an	accelerator	as	being	groups	of	people	who	bring	business	experience	to	support	nascent	firms,	to	help	them	survive	the	earliest	stages	of	their	development.	This	support,	they	explained,	can	include	office	space,	mentorship,	networking,	knowledge,	and	expertise.	The	definition	taking	shape,	3	












































































































































































































































Therefore,	in	terms	of	defining	an	accelerator,	investing	should	no	longer	be	seen	as	a	mandatory	activity	for	a	program	to	be	considered	an	accelerator,	and	should	not	be	the	only,	or	the	main	measure	by	which	a	program	is	judged.				2.3.4.3	Evaluating	other	outcomes		This	examination	of	investment	outcomes,	and	the	suggestion	that	other	outcomes	should	also	be	valued	suggests	that	evaluating	whether	accelerators	work	poses	many	challenges.	It	is	difficult	to	make	meaningful	comparative	studies	between	startups	that	did	and	did	not	attend	programs	because	no	two	startups	are	the	same.	Various	studies	(e.g.	Hochberg	2015),	have	looked	at	the	success	of	accelerated	startups	in	raising	further	investment	compared	to	those	which	did	so	without	the	support	of	a	program.	However,	the	author	of	this	thesis	argues	that	ascribing	to	the	accelerator	whether	a	startup	raises,	for	example	$1m	or	does	not,	or	does	so	more	quickly,	seems	too	specific	a	measure	for	something	that	is	so	complex	and	nuanced	as	a	disruptive	new	business.			Bone	et	al.	(2017)	acknowledged	that	there	is	no	agreed	set	of	criteria	for	measuring	the	performance	of	accelerators,	but	posited	that	commonly	used	metrics	include:	• The	number	of	applicants	to	a	program	• The	number	of	startups	supported	by	the	program	• How	much	further	investment	the	startups	raised	• The	survival	rate	of	the	startups	• The	number	of	people	employed	by	the	startups	






























































































































































1. the	expectations	of	return	based	on	trustworthiness	within	the	network;		2. the	ability	of	the	social	network	to	facilitate	the	flow	of	information;		3. and	the	role	of	norms	and	the	ability	to	police	those	norms.		These	three	aspects	of	Social	Capital	explain	the	dynamics	of	an	accelerator,	whereby	people	co-operate	with	a	view	to	some	form	of	return,	which	might	be	social	validation	or	access	to	non-redundant	information,	rather	than	just	an	economic	return,	like	being	paid.	This	co-operation	and	internal	trust	encourages	the	flow	of	information,	in	particular	the	ability	to	source	non-redundant	information	and	validate	it,	which	equates	to	a	form	of	value	to	others.	This	particular	structure	of	the	network	around	an	accelerator	also	consequently	supports	the	establishment	and	communication	of	norms,	and	the	ability	to	police	these	with	link	reciprocity	(see	2.3.3.2).			This	is	supported	by	Coleman’s	(1988,	1990)	conclusion	(see	2.2.2.2)	that	Social	Capital	is	strengthened	in	closed	networks	because	norms	are	understood,	and	they	have	the	social	mechanisms	for	reward	and	sanction.	This	leads	to	greater	trust,	suggesting	that	in	this	context	Social	Capital	can	widely	be	interpreted	as	trust.	This	explains	the	high	levels	of	trust	observed	in	accelerators,	for	example	by	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	(see	2.3.1),	as	residing	in	the	closed	core	of	the	accelerator,	which	is	rich	in	bonding	Social	Capital.	This	core	is	the	cohort	and	management	team,	and	whoever	else	is	closely	involved	with	the	establishment	and	running	of	the	program.		The	way	in	which	trust	and	value	becomes	useful	to	the	specific	outcomes	of	an	accelerator	lie	in	the	observation	(see	2.2.2.4)	of	Adler	&	Kwon	(2002)	who	stated	that	a	







































































































































































































































Selection	of	mentors	was	therefore	based	on	the	following	considerations:	1. Had	they	mentored	startups	before,	and	therefore	did	they	understand	what	mentoring	in	this	context	means?	2. They	were	excluded	if	they	asked	for	payment,	as	this	suggested	they	did	not	understand	the	norms	around	cooperation	and	creating	Social	Capital	that	benefits	the	wider	ecosystem.	3. They	needed	to	have	either	very	strong	networks,	or	some	relevant	knowledge	to	transfer	to	the	startups,	or	both.	But	if	they	had	neither	they	were	unlikely	to	offer	enough	value	to	justify	the	time	they	would	take	from	the	startups	for	a	mentoring	session.		4. They	needed	to	be	comfortable	with	the	fast	nature	of	mentoring,	generally	20-30	minute	initial	mentoring	sessions.	Those	who	felt	they	required	hours,	or	multiple	meetings,	may	be	excluded	because	this	was	not	in	keeping	with	the	style	of	an	accelerator	like	EyeFocus.		5. 		4.3.3	Retaining	diversity	in	a	niche	or	corporate	accelerator		Structuring	an	accelerator	in	a	very	niche	vertical,	like	eye-care,	and	with	large	corporate	sponsors	or	partners,	created	a	risk	of	building	a	network	of	mentors	that	consisted	only	of	people	from	the	eye-care	sector,	or	only	provided	by	the	sponsors,	which	would,	as	suggested	above	(see	3.2.13),	lead	to	more	rapid	decay	function	due	to	the	duplication	of	knowledge	and	triadic	closure	between	the	mentors.				

























































































































































































Framework	9:00-13:00:	1st	block	13:00-13:30:	Lunch	break	13:30-16:00:	2nd	block	16:00	-	19:00:	One-on-One	coaching														20:00	-	Official	Launch	Party	 All	Startups	+	Associates	Saturday	 21	Feb	15	 		 		Sunday	 22	Feb	15	 		 			Figure	3.	Timetable	for	first	week	of	EyeFocus				




















































































































































































































In	discussion	with	mentors	at	the	beginning	and	end	of	the	program,	many	had	initially	said	they	were	mentoring	to	‘give	back,’	but	at	the	end	listed	new	network	contacts	and	opportunities	as	an	outcome	of	mentoring.	This	suggests	EyeFocus	responded	to	the	theory	that	mentors	are	rewarded	with	Social	Capital,	and	ensured	they	received	social	benefits	from	their	engagement	with	the	program,	even	when	they	may	not	have	anticipated	it.				5.5.3	Organising	Mentors		The	literature	suggested	that	when	startups	are	left	to	arrange	their	own	mentoring	they	have	less	mentoring,	and	it	is	therefore	the	role	of	the	accelerator	to	facilitate	mentoring	(Cohen	2013;	see	2.3.3.2).		It	was	therefore	important	for	EyeFocus	to	take	an	active	role	in	managing	mentoring	interactions.	Despite	planning	in	advance,	the	process	of	managing	mentors	needed	to	adapt	to	the	program	as	lessons	were	learned.		The	challenges	involved:	1.	 Ensuring	that	all	mentors	had	some	mentoring	sessions.	2.	 Ensuring	that	all	startups	met	all	the	mentors	they	wanted	to	talk	to.	3.	 Mapping	which	mentors	could	best	support	which	startups.	












Variations	of	in-person	mentoring	1.	 Traditional	speed	mentoring,	where	a	mentor	sits	at	a	table,	and	startups	are	rotated	every	20	minutes	to	speak	to	them.	This	worked	well	when	either	one	mentor	was	present	at	the	accelerator,	or	when	multiple	mentors	visited.		2.	 A	mentor	addressing	a	group	of	startups	at	once.	This	typically	involved	each	startup	giving	a	very	quick	pitch,	then	the	mentor	talking	about	their	specialist	topic,	answering	questions,	and	offering	advice	to	startups	based	on	their	pitches	or	questions.	This	was	effective	particularly	when	a	mentor	did	not	have	time	to	meet	each	startup.		3.	 Mentors	only	having	meetings	with	selected	startups	based	on	specific	interests	of	the	mentor,	or	needs	of	the	startup.	This	suited	specialists,	or	mentors	who	either	did	not	have	time,	or	did	not	have	the	interest	to	meet	every	startup.		
	
Variations	of	online	mentoring	Online	mentoring	is	less	attractive	than	sitting	at	the	same	table	as	a	mentor,	and	is	more	complicated	to	organise.	However,	given	the	global	nature	of	EyeFocus,	both	in	


















• A	variety	of	technology	options,	including	built	in	or	external	cameras	and	microphones		Over	time,	various	problems	were	encountered,	and	best	practice	emerged	from	the	experience:	1. If	the	mentor	and	startup	were	given	a	time	and	left	to	call	each	other	multiple	things	could	go	wrong,	including	technology	not	working	(no	sound,	no	video),	or	confusion	over	time	zone	differences,	or	just	one	party	forgetting	about	the	call.				From	this	it	became	clear	that	each	call	had	to	be	set	up	by	an	EyeFocus	team	member,	who	would	typically	call	the	startup	first,	check	they	were	online	and	available,	and	check	their	sound	and	video	before	bringing	the	mentor	into	the	call.	This	became	very	time	consuming	and	a	full-time	job	for	the	appointed	team	member.	2. When	numerous	people	called	in	from	different	computers,	Google	Hangout	would	bring	to	the	front	the	video	of	any	caller	making	a	noise.	Therefore,	it	was	


























































































                                               
1 Mr Patch, and Blindsense (see 8.3) 















































• Being	blocked	by	their	university	from	engaging	with	an	accelerator.	This	was	mainly	down	to	misconceptions	by	some	university	tech	transfer	offices	about	protecting	IP,	but	also	in	some	cases	an	incorrect	sense	that	EyeFocus	was	competing	with	the	university’s	tech	transfer	office.	Some	universities	simply	required	too	long	to	consider	contracts,	or	in	one	case	required	EyeFocus	to	sign	an	NDA	that	would	have	made	it	impossible	for	the	startup	to	attend	the	accelerator	or	meet	mentors.			• A	strange	observation	about	different	cultural	approaches	was	that	French	companies	insisted	on	NDAs	before	discussing	anything	with	anyone,	rendering	it	impossible	for	them	to	have	a	meaningful	engagement	with	the	accelerator	or	mentors.	This	appeared	to	be	a	pattern	specific	to	French	companies,	and	reflected	a	very	different	approach	to	confidentiality	and	trust.	• Other	companies	were	simply	too	far	away	to	engage	with	the	program,	such	as	one	in	Australia.	The	cost	of	coming	to	Berlin	was	too	high	and	the	time	zone	made	it	hard	to	meet	online.		The	fact	that	37	companies	did	not	join	the	cohort	suggests	that	the	selection	process	was	effective	in	filtering	applicants,	and	ensuring	the	cohort	consisted	of	a	best	in	class	that	would	be	of	value	to	the	mentors,	sponsors,	and	partners.								





























































something	back,’	that	they	enjoy	supporting	new	entrepreneurs.	They	also	mentor	to	learn	what	is	new	in	a	sector	of	innovation,	and	to	benefit	from	the	networking	opportunities	around	accelerators	(see	2.3.3.1).			In	this	thesis	Social	Network	Theory	has	been	used	to	examine	mentoring	in	more	detail.	This	offers	an	explanation	based	on	the	underlying	aspects	of	the	social	interaction,	described	mainly	in	terms	of	Social	Capital.	Mentors	gain	a	number	of	social	outcomes	that	equate	to	the	value	(see	3.2.5	and	4.5.2)	inherent	in	Social	Capital:	1. Tie	formation,	namely	new	network	contacts	which	equate	to	value	by	offering	bridging	ties	to	novel	and	non-redundant	information	(see	3.2.3)	2. Validation	and	social	credentials	through	being	selected	by	and	associated	with	the	accelerator,	which	is	thus	sharing	its	Social	Capital	and	status	3. Early	access	to	novel	information	in	the	form	of	innovations	being	created	by	the	cohort				6.2.3	Link	reciprocity	explains	why	accelerators	do	not	use	NDAs		The	use	of	link	reciprocity	does	not	just	apply	to	mentors	but	also	explains	overall	the	way	in	which	the	norms	of	accelerator	networks	are	policed.		Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	observed	that	accelerators	do	not	favour	the	use	of	NDAs,	explaining	this	as	a	function	of	the	accelerator’s	position	within	a	wider	ecosystem	(see	2.3.1).			





































































































7.1	INTRODUCTION		Returning	to	the	aims	and	objectives	stated	in	the	introduction	of	this	thesis,	the	first	3	aims	were	completed	within	the	body	of	the	thesis:	1. To	use	a	literature	review	to	identify	the	aspects	of	Social	Network	Theory	that	can	be	used	to	describe	a	startup	accelerator.	2. To	provide	a	summary	of	the	main	academic	literature	about	accelerators.	3. To	apply	this	theory	to	the	design	of	EyeFocus	accelerator	in	order	to	examine	it	in	situ.	The	last	two	aims	are	now	addressed	in	this	concluding	chapter:	4. To	use	this	exercise	to	reach	conclusions	on	how	accelerators	should	be	run	in	the	future.		5. To	create	a	definition	of	an	accelerator	based	on	Social	Network	Theory	which	can	inform	the	design	and	execution	of	future	accelerators.			7.2	CONCLUSIONS		According	to	the	approach	taken	by	this	thesis,	an	accelerator	has	been	described	as	a	specific	form	of	social	network	(see	3.2.17).		This	enabled	a	discussion	about	accelerators	that	focusses	on	the	underlying	social	network	dynamics,	rather	than	the	elements	of	the	business	support	program	(see	2.4.1).	This	Social	Network	Theory	approach	to	understanding	an	accelerator	introduced	the	concepts	from	Social	Network	
















































































































































































	Figure	5.	EyeFocus	Accelerator	team,	mentors,	and	startups	in	Rainmaking	Loft	on	launch	day		EyeFocus	Accelerator	in	summary:	•	 Identified	over	90	startups	around	the	world	innovating	in	eye-care	•	 Engaged	with	startups	from	over	20	countries		•	 Supported	16	companies	from	13	countries	on	the	program	•	 Invested	in	or	funded	5	companies	•	 Worked	with	57	mentors	from	18	different	countries	•	 Organised	161	direct	mentoring	interactions	•	 Ran	44	partner	events					






































Week	4	–	Visiting	London	The	week	in	London	was	arranged	early	in	the	program	in	order	to	allow	the	cohort	to	meet	people	and	have	enough	time	in	the	program	to	follow	up	and	engage	with	them.	The	aims	of	the	visit	were:	1. To	present	EyeFocus	to	the	London	startup	and	eye-care	sectors	2. To	arrange	visits	to	key	partners,	and	arrange	mentoring	sessions	3. To	expose	the	startups	to	an	important	startup	and	eye-care	ecosystem	4. To	build	out	the	weak	tie	networks	of	the	startups	in	a	different	geography,	so	they	were	not	restricted	just	to	contacts	in	Berlin	
	
KPMG	tax	&	startups	workshop	The	week	started	off	at	Rainmaking	Loft	London,	sister-location	to	EyeFocus’s	home	in	Berlin,	where	the	startups	met	with	tax,	medtech	and	startup	experts	from	KPMG’s	High	Growth	Tech	Group.	The	cohort	were	given	an	overview	of	the	London	tech	scene	and	how	they	can	access	support	from	KPMG.	This	was	followed	by	a	thorough	grounding	in	UK	tax	law	relevant	to	startups,	as	well	as	a	Q&A.	The	session	ended	with	one-to-one	meetings	between	KPMG	staff	and	startups,	in	which	our	companies	could	get	more	in-depth	advice	on	how	to	operate	within	the	UK.		Whilst	at	Rainmaking	Loft,	the	cohort	had	a	final	pitch	rehearsal	for	the	investor	event	at	Bloomberg	that	evening.	Startups	were	told	they	had	to	attend	this	pitch	training	event	or	they	would	not	be	allowed	to	pitch	to	the	investors	later.	This	was	to	protect	both	EyeFocus,	and	the	cohort,	by	ensuring	the	pitch	standard	was	consistently	high.		



















































































































































































































































Mentoring Guide - for Startups  
Mentoring is one of the core aspects of any accelerator program, and we feel it is one of the 
most valuable. Not only is it a unique opportunity to network with influential experts across 
diverse fields, it is also a great chance to learn new skills, ask questions, and seek advice 
and expertise from people who understand a topic deeply. There are very few circumstances 
where people like this will so freely and openly offer you their time on a one-to-one basis, 
and it shouldn’t be underestimated.  
We have prepared this short guide to help you get the most of these time-limited sessions.  
 
How to maximise the impact of your mentoring sessions  
1. Before the Meeting 
• Keep the EyeFocus team informed of ANY mentoring meeting you are having, however 
informal or quick. Please never contact mentors directly for a first session, this should 
always be organised by EyeFocus.  
• Always research your mentor. Google them, read their biography on the EyeFocus 
website, find out their back story and experiences. Even people who at first seem less 
relevant may appear more interesting once you understand a bit more about them.  
• Think about what you want from the session before it begins. Where possible, prepare 
some questions in advance. This doesn’t have to involve a lot of work, and could just be a 
few bullet points jotted down. This will help guide your conversation, ensure it’s heading in 
a useful direction, and hopefully get the information you want.  
• Think about how you appear. This may often seem less important in a startup setting, but 
the way you present yourself still matters. If your mentor is from a more corporate 
background, you might want to think about dressing a little more formally that day. Think 
about the image you want to project.  
• Bring your business card and remember to give it to your mentor! 





• Have a clear pitch – you are not selling, but you need to summarise what you are doing 
and what you need very quickly to avoid wasting your session. 
• Remember to talk about what you don’t know, what you are missing, and what you need, 
rather than just saying how great your startup is. Mentors are there to help, not to be 
impressed.  
• Be polite. You are getting their time for free. Always turn off your phone and close your 
laptop. Never, never check messages, or answer the phone in a mentoring session.  
• NEVER BE LATE. In fact, be early. Lateness wastes your time, their time, and reflects 
badly on you and EyeFocus. NEVER BE LATE!  
3. After the Meeting 
• Speak to an EyeFocus team member about the mentoring session, even if it’s just a quick 
email. We need to have an idea about how each mentoring session goes and keep track 
of who met who.  
• Always follow up quickly. It’s likely that your mentor is a busy person who meets a lot of 
people, so they might not remember you for long. Capitalise on that first meeting by 
following up on any actions immediately. This will also show them that you’re reliable. 
• Do what you say you’ll do. It’s amazing how many startups say they’ll contact the mentor 
with information, or to remind them to follow up an introduction, and then forget. 
• Always take notes!! Keep all your notes in Evernote. What did they say, who do they know, 
what actions did you agree? In Evernote you can search for this easily in the future.  
• Keep track of who you met. They may not be useful now, but they could be important in 
the future. 
• Remember you are building a personal network for your future.  
 
Skype Mentoring 
Skype mentoring will be an important element of the EyeFocus program, both for Startups 
and Associates. There are a lot of benefits to mentoring over Skype: it allows us to interact 
with a much broader range of fantastic mentors (many of them not based in Berlin), it means 
our associates can be supported from anywhere in the world, and it makes it easier to fit 
mentoring around busy lives.  
The rules above should apply just as much to Skype mentoring - in fact, it’s probably 
necessary to be even more organised, since clarity is very important when speaking 
remotely.  
Here are some more tips specific to Skype mentoring: 
• Check time differences: what time zone is your mentor in - when does that mean you’re 
talking in Berlin time? 





• Do you have their Skype address? This seems obvious, but make sure you know this 
beforehand, not 5 minutes before you’re meant to be speaking! This will save time and 
avoid confusion.  
• Are you in a quiet room, with good acoustics? Try to limit distractions. 
• Make sure before you call that your microphone and speakers are working –	do a test call 
to someone in EyeFocus to be sure.  
• Turn off anything on your laptop that uses bandwidth to ensure a clear call. 
• Once you have added a mentor on Skype, that doesn’t	mean you can write to them 
anytime afterwards. Only call or write when you fix an appointment, unless they ask you 
to.   										


































































































































































































AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
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